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Abstract
This paper analyses the impact of the skill composition of migration flows on the
host country’s labour market in a specific-factors-two-sector model with heteroge-
neous labour (low-, medium-, and high-skilled). We assume price-setting behaviour
in both manufacturing and services sectors. The low- and medium-skilled labour
markets are characterized by frictions due to wage bargaining. Moreover, we assume
bumping down of unemployed medium-skilled workers into low-skilled service jobs
whereas endogenous benefits create an interdependency between the two bargaining
processes. Particular attention is paid to medium-skilled migration which enables us
to augment the literature by replicating important stylized facts regarding medium
skills, such as i) the interaction between immigration, low-skilled unemployment
and medium-skilled over-qualification, ii) the polarization effect where both low-
and high-skilled wages increase relative to the medium-skilled. The model is cali-
brated using German data. The key findings are: (i) a perfectly balanced migration
has a neutral impact on the receiving economy due to international capital flows; (ii)
immigration of medium-skilled labour together with some high-skilled labour low-
ers the low-skilled unemployment rate and has a positive effect on output per capita;
(iii) migration of only medium-skilled labour has a neutral GDP per capita effect.
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1. Introduction
The admission of ten Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) into the Euro-
pean Union has made the incumbent member states worried about the adverse economic
consequences due to potential mass migration from those countries.1 This has lead to
transitional restrictions − with UK, Sweden, and Ireland as exceptions − on the free
movement of workers vis--vis new member states. With the end of the transitional pe-
riods as of May 2011 the debate concerning the East-West mass migration has revived
in countries like Germany and Austria, the closest countries to those new members, that
had fully prolonged the transitional periods up to seven years. The main rationale for this
restrictive action and the general concerns is explained by the perception regarding the
adverse consequences for the natives, particularly, for the least skilled workers (cf. for a
survey Dustmann et al. (2008)).2 The empirical evidence on the labour market impact of
migration is rather mixed and clusters usually around zero.3 However, widely recognized
phenomena in the literature on the economic impact of immigration are that high-skilled
immigrants have a positive influence on GDP growth and employment, while low-skilled
migrants have a negative influence.4
Economic theory provides clear grounds for both phenomena, although the appropri-
ateness of the empirical approach has been questioned and criticized (see Borjas (2003)).
The displacement effect of native workers due to immigration can be explained by two
main forces: i) the substitution effect, and ii) the “crowding-out” effect. While the former
denotes the shifts in the relative factor demand determined by the underlying produc-
tion technology, the second effect emphasizes the shifts in the labour supply that might
displace the least skilled from the labour market. This paper incorporates both effects.
The empirical evidence indicates, in fact, that immigrants face a higher risk of over-
qualification, i.e. they perform jobs for which skill requirement is less than their qualifi-
1On 1 May 2004, eight CEECs, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Slovakia, and Slovenia plus two Mediterranean countries Malta and Cyprus joined the EU with Bulgaria
and Romania followed on 1 January 2007.
2See also Boeri and Brcker (2005) who emphasize the concerns regarding welfare-effects.
3The empirical studies looking at the post-accession effects for the UK labour market could not find any
significant impact on native wages and unemployment (cf. Gilpin et al. (2006), Lemos and Portes (2008),
Blanchflower et al. (2007)). See also Kahanec and Zimmermann (2010) for a survey of the literature.
4See, for instance, Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle (2008) for the impact of high-skilled migration on in-
novation; for a more general discussion on immigration and economic growth, see Hanson (2012), and on
immigration and the welfare sates, see Griswold (2012).
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cation − see OECD (2007) for a cross-country evidence and Drinkwater et al. (2009) for
UK.
Surprisingly enough, very little attention is paid to the impact of medium-skilled mi-
grants as a separate category, although nowadays they constitute the major component of
immigrants and employees.5 This paper seeks to correct this omission by analysing the
impact of immigration in a two-sector model, with three types of skills. We assume wage-
and-price-setting behaviour in both manufacturing and services sectors. This enables us
to augment the literature by replicating important stylized facts regarding medium skills,
such as i) the interaction between immigration, low-skilled unemployment and medium-
skilled over-qualification, ii) the so called polarization effect where both low- and high-
skilled wages have increased relative to the medium-skilled wages.6
A seminal way of analyzing the impact of immigration on output, wages and (un)employment
has been introduced by Borjas (2003) and Ottaviano and Peri (2008, 2011) for the U.S.
economy. They use a production function in which output is produced utilizing capital
and labour, while labour is defined by a multi-level-nested (skill-experience-nationality)
CES composite − a common approach in the labour markets studies (cf. Card and
Lemieux (2001)). From this function demand for labour is derived, and the market clear-
ing wage results from equality with exogenous labour supply. Since in the European
context labour markets usually do not clear, in particular not when immigration is in-
volved, several recent papers analyse the wage and (un)employment effects of migration
for imperfect labour markets. Three recent papers in this field are Brcker and Jahn (2011),
D’Amuri et al. (2010), and Felbermayr et al. (2010), which all apply to the case of Ger-
many. All three studies use the multi-level nested CES production function to derive
demand for labour. However, instead of competitive wages, they introduce a wage setting
curve where wages for a certain skill are negatively related to unemployment in that skill
group. Using data for Germany, they estimate the elasticity of substitution between the
different education-experience groups as well as between natives and foreigners. More-
over, they estimate the unemployment elasticity of wages. Given these estimation results
they then simulate the impact of immigration on wages and (un)employment of each sub
5Since we match our model with German data using the EU KLEMS data set, the different skill groups
are defined as follows. High-skilled: University graduates, Medium-skilled: Intermediate qualifications,
and low-skilled: No formal qualifications, see Timmer et al. (2007).
6Storesletten (2000) is an exception doing generational accounting for medium-skilled migration.
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group.7
All these studies, however, focus mainly on two types of migration scenarios in the
simulation of their models: low-skilled or high-skilled migration flows. The overall re-
sult from these studies is that incumbent immigrants are mostly hurt by new immigrants,
while natives are positively (or at least neutrally) affected in the long-run. We hope, there-
fore, to provide new insights by adding interesting labour market features such as wage
determination through multiple sectoral bargaining processes interconnected by bumping
down and endogenous benefits.
We, therefore, pursue a different route, which essentially opens the black box of a
multi-level-nested CES to describe the substitution possibilities. In our approach, we
specify a specific-factors two-sector model, with three types of labour. Motivated by our
stylized facts which will be presented below, the manufacturing sector employs medium
and high-skilled labour, while the service sector employs low and high-skilled labour
in both cases next to capital. This model resembles to some extent that of Felbermayr
and Kohler (2006, 2007) who examine the immigration effect for heterogeneous and per-
fectly competitive labour markets (low, medium, and high skill levels) and allow for inter-
industry trade in a similar specific-factors model. However, in our model we allow for
both wage bargaining and price setting in both sectors, which allows for unemployment
of low skilled workers and bumping down of medium skilled workers to low skilled jobs.
The advantage of this approach in our view is that the substitution between types of work-
ers is less mechanical when compared to the multi-level CES, and less rigid over time.
We allow for economic mechanisms to play a role due to shifts in the sectoral composi-
tion of the economy and substitution between labour and capital within sectors, next to
bumping down of medium skilled workers to low skilled jobs. Moreover, this approach
allows us to focus on the impact of medium skilled immigration, which is the dominant
type of immigration nowadays (see Table 1), but largely ignored in the literature. The fo-
cus on medium skilled migration is important not only from an economic point of view,
but also from a policy perspective. High-skilled immigration is not controversial due to
its commonly accepted and well documented beneficial impact on the receiving country.
Politically less accepted are policies in favour of unskilled immigration, simply because
7As shown recently by Ottaviano and Peri (2011), the elasticity of substitutions between different skill-
age groups is significantly affected by the nesting structure of the labour composite. See also Borjas et al.
(2008, 2011) for further discussion on this issue.
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of its perceived adverse welfare and economic effects. Therefore, as we show below, the
neutral impact of medium-skilled labour migration induces an interesting policy implica-
tion for the future labour shortage problems indicating the permanent outflow from the
labour market, e.g. due to ageing.
The set up of the paper is as follows. The next section presents the stylized facts on
migration pattern, labour market composition, and trends in employment and wages in
the manufacturing and service sectors for Germany. In section 3. we demonstrate the
theoretical framework with two major sectors, three skill groups and a double wage bar-
gaining model determining the wages of medium- and low-skilled labour. In section 4.,
we provide first a qualitative assessment of the comparative static analysis, derived by
means of log-linearisation around the steady-state, followed by an intuitive interpretation
of the theoretical results. In section 5., we calibrate the model for Germany using the EU-
KLEMS data set to measure the quantitative importance of various migration scenarios.
Finally, section 6. presents the concluding remarks.
2. Stylized facts
At the aggregated level, the average impact of immigration on unemployment and wages
of native workers has been explored quite extensively and tend to cluster around zero,
as discussed above. However, as already emphasized, the literature on migration has
somehow ignored the potential impact of medium-skilled work force, although it accounts
for a large part of the total labour force as well as of the foreign work force nowadays.
Table 1 highlights this feature in the case of Germany by showing the composition of the
total labour force across manufacturing and service sectors as well as of the foreign labour
force by skill groups for the years 1991 and 2005. Noticeable, the most pronounced
increase was in the share of foreign medium-skilled labour.
Another phenomenon that has recently attracted the attention is the job polarization
phenomenon in many developed countries. Table 2 presents this for Germany where
we show the percentage changes in the total employment shares as well as in the wage
rates by education and industry for the period 1991-2005. One sees clearly that high-
skilled employment shares increased in both sectors, whereas the low-skilled share in
manufacturing declined and the medium-skilled share in services. Moreover, both low-
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Table 1: Total and foreign labour force, by education groups
1991 2005
Total Mig. Total Mig.
Skills Agg. Manuf. Serv. Agg. Manuf. Serv.
High (%) 8 6 9 4 10 7 10 6
Medium (%) 64 63 65 48 62 66 61 61
Low (%) 28 31 25 48 28 27 28 33
Notes: Agg.=Aggregate, Manuf.=Manufacturing, Serv.=Services, Mig.=Migrants. The total
shares denote the shares in hours worked, and are calculated from EU KLEMS. The number
for foreigners are taken from Brcker and Jahn (2011), but denoting, respectively, the years
1990 and 2004. Medium-skilled consists of the educational groups: vocational and high-
school.
and high-skilled wages grew faster relative to medium-skilled wages reflecting the U-
shaped trend found in the empirical literature (see, for example, Autor and Dorn (2010)
for the U.S. and Goos et al. (2009) for Europe). While the main rationale behind this
trend is explained by the advances in information and communication technology (see,
for instance, Van Reenen et al. (2010)), this paper gives an alternative explanation. We
show that it might also be due to relative increase in the medium-skilled labour force due
to migration. This brings us to the next stylized fact.
A study by OECD (2007) documents that the labour market performance of im-
migrants is denoted by higher risk of over-qualification. Recent studies on post-EU-
enlargement provide further evidence. For example, Drinkwater et al. (2009) analyse
the performance of Polish immigrants in the UK labour market and find that majority of
them are employed in low-skilled and low-paid jobs despite having relatively high levels
of education.8
Moreover, a recent study by Brynin and Longhi (2009) finds for Germany, using
households survey data, a relative excess of over-qualification at the medium-skilled level
which contributes to almost half of all overqualified persons. This indicates that beside
the standard argumentation of denoting the technical change as the main deriving force
8See also Kahanec and Zimmermann (2010) for a review of the recent literature.
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Table 2: Changes in wage rates and employment shares, by education and industry
1991−2005
Wage Rate Employment Share
Manufacturing Sector (in %)
High 59 25
Medium 40 4
Low 42 −15
Service Sector (in %)
High 44 13
Medium 36 −7
Low 41 5
Notes: The numbers denote log-differences. Employment shares designate the shares
in hours worked. Source: EU KLEMS.
behind the increase in low-skilled unemployment rate, the increase in the low-skilled
unemployment rate might be the consequence of an increase in supply of better educated
workers leading to the so called “crowding-out” of low-skilled workers. Using German
data, Figure 1 shows the relation between low-skilled unemployment rate and the over-
qualification rate of low-skilled type of jobs. Except for 2000-2004 (the ICT bust period)
where a positive relation can be seen, it designates a reverse relation, especially, in the
recent years. This observation might be the result of the 2005 labour market reforms in
Germany, the so-called Hartz reforms.
We summarize these stylized facts as follows
1. Medium-skilled workers constitute a major component of the labour force and of
immigrants
2. High-skilled employment rises in both sectors with low-skilled declining in man-
ufacturing sector and medium-skilled in service sector
3. Medium-skilled labour has a higher incidence of over-qualification
4. There is a negative relation between the over-qualification rate in low-skilled jobs
and the low-skilled unemployment rate
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Figure 1: Trends in low-skilled unemployment and over-qualification rates
Note: The over-qualification (OQ) rate denotes the proportion of medium-skilled workers in low-skilled
jobs. Source: Eurostat.
5. Both low-skilled and high-skilled wages have increased relative to the medium-
skilled wage, which points at wage polarization
3. The theoretical framework
The economy is defined by two major sectors, manufacturing (Ym) and services (Ys), each
producing a good by utilizing physical capital and labour. These two goods are in turn
used in a CES aggregate to produce a final consumption good (X). We interpret X as
the total GDP which is taken as the numeraire, i.e. its price is set to unity. The CES
aggregate can be interpreted as the production technology of a final good sector or as the
utility function of a representative household. In light of the stylized facts reported in
Section 2., we assume that medium-skilled labour is specific to manufacturing sector and
low-skilled labour specific to the services sector - although bumping down of medium
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skilled labour to low skilled service jobs can occur. Capital and high-skilled labour are
employed in both sectors. We assume that firms in manufacturing and services sectors
have a monopoly power which is ensured by a fixed entry cost. The high skilled wage
is determined on a competitive labour market, but medium and low skilled wages are
determined by wage bargaining. We elaborate these points below in the context of a
general equilibrium framework.
3.1. Final consumption good
The final consumption good (or the GDP) is produced by the following CES function
X =
(
γY
θ−1
θ
m +(1− γ)Y
θ−1
θ
s
) θ
θ−1
(1)
where θ > 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution between the two sectors and 0 < γ < 1
is the distribution parameter.
From (1), we obtain the isoelastic demand functions for manufacturing and service
goods
Y dm = γ
θX
(
Pm
P
)−θ
(2a)
Y ds = (1− γ)θX
(
Ps
P
)−θ
(2b)
respectively, where P =
(
(1− γ)θP1−θs + γθP1−θm
) 1
1−θ denotes the macroeconomic price
index which is taken as numeraire in the remaining part of the analysis. As a consequence
all variables are defined in real terms and we assume no inflation.
3.2. Manufacturing and services goods
After incurring a fixed cost, firms in both sectors produce a good with a standard Cobb-
Douglas production technology with constant returns to scale. Note that positive profits
are ensured simply by the assumption of relatively high fixed costs such that free-entry
is ruled out, see Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004, Ch. 7) for a general discussion. Based
on our discussion above, in the manufacturing sector high- (Hm) and medium-skilled (M)
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labour are employed, whereas in the service sector high- (Hs) and low-skilled (L) labour
are utilized.
The production functions for manufacturing and services are given by
Ym = AKνmH
α
m M
1−α−ν (3a)
Ys = BKηs H
β
s L1−β−η (3b)
respectively, where 0 < {α,β ,ν ,η} < 1. The total factor productivity in manufactur-
ing and services is denoted by exogenous variables A and B, respectively, with A > B
reflecting the higher productivity of manufacturing relative to services.
3.3. Factor demand
Firms determine factor demand by minimizing their costs given the factor prices. The
rental cost of capital, r∗, is determined on the international capital market since capital
is assumed to be perfectly mobile. Furthermore, high skilled workers are assumed to be
mobile between the service and manufacturing sectors. As a consequence the high-skilled
wage is equalized between the two sectors: wmH = w
s
H = wH . The wage bargaining in the
medium skilled and the low skilled labour markets determine wM and wL, respectively.
Factor demand, then, is determined by minimizing the manufacturing production costs
Cm = wHHm+wMM+ r∗Km (4)
subject to production technology (3a). Similarly, factor demand in the service sector is
determined by minimizing the service production costs
Cs = wHHs+wLL+ r∗Ks (5)
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subject to the production technology (3b). Solving the optimization problems, the factor
demand functions in the manufacturing sector are given by
Hdm = α
Ym
A
(wH
W m
)−1
(6a)
Md = (1−α−ν)Ym
A
(wM
W m
)−1
(6b)
Kdm = ν
Ym
A
(
r∗
W m
)−1
(6c)
and in the services sector by
Hds = β
Ys
B
(wH
W s
)−1
(7a)
Ld = (1−β −η)Ys
B
(wL
W s
)−1
(7b)
Kds = η
Ys
B
(
r∗
W s
)−1
(7c)
where W m =
(
r∗
ν
)ν (wH
α
)α ( wM
1−α−ν
)1−α−ν and W s = ( r∗η )η (wHβ )β ( wL1−β−η)1−β−η de-
note the geometric weighted average factor price composite in the manufacturing and
services sectors, respectively.
Substituting (6a)-(6c) into the cost function, (4), and similarly (7a)-(7c) into (5), we
obtain the minimized cost functions
C∗m(wH ,wM,r
∗) =
W m
A
Ym (8a)
C∗s (wH ,wL,r
∗) =
W s
B
Ys (8b)
for manufacturing and service good producers, respectively.
3.4. Price setting for intermediate goods
As shown in the previous section, firms in the two major sectors face a downward-sloping
domestic demand function for their products. Therefore, a representative manufacturing
good producer sets the price of her good by maximizing her profit
Πm = PmYm−C∗m(W m,Ym) (9)
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subject to (2a). Similarly, a representative service good producer maximizes her profit
Πs = PsYs−C∗s (W s,Ys) (10)
subject to (2b). Solving the maximization problems, yield the standard pricing behaviour,
respectively, in the manufacturing and service sectors
Pm =
θ
θ −1
W m
A
(11a)
Ps =
θ
θ −1
W s
B
. (11b)
3.5. Wage setting and the labour market features
As discussed above, high skilled workers are mobile between the two intermediate sec-
tors, and we assume labour market clearing for them. However, in line with the Euro-
pean labour market institutions, wage bargaining occurs in both low- and medium-skilled
labour markets - see, for example,Brcker and Jahn (2011) where wage-setting curves dif-
fer across sectors. In our framework two different labour unions negotiate the wages for
medium- and low-skilled workers in the manufacturing and services sectors, respectively.
But, as we elaborate below, wages are not independent. On the one hand medium skilled
workers can be bumped down into the service jobs, earning low-skilled wages, which
influences the reference wage of medium skilled workers. On the other hand, medium
skilled wages will have an impact on the level of the benefits, which will influence the
reference wage of low skilled workers.
Following Booth (1995) and Layard et al. (2005), wages are determined by the right-
to-manage bargaining solution so that the negotiating parties only bargain over the wages,
whereas the optimal employment decisions is made by the firms. In doing so, we also
follow the conventional way by assuming that in each sector there exists a continuum of
identical firms and unions and therefore neglect firm-union-specific indices (cf. Koskela
and Stenbacka, 2009, 2010). Firm’s net gain is simply the flow of profits, i.e. net of the
fixed costs. This is given for the manufacturing and services firms, respectively, by the
equations (9) and (10). The net gain for the labour union is simply the net result of the
bargained wage and the outside option. Thus, the objective function of the manufacturing
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and service labour unions is given, respectively, by
Um = (wM− w¯M)M (12)
Us = (wL− w¯L)L (13)
where w¯ j,∀ j = L,M denotes the outside option which is taken as given by each labour
union. Thus, the medium-skilled wage is the result of the following maximization prob-
lem
max
wM
ΩM =
(
(wM− w¯M)Md
)δm
Π1−δmm s.t.(2a),(6b),(9),(11a)
Similarly, the low-skilled wage is set by solving the following maximization problem
max
wL
ΩL =
(
(wL− w¯L)Ld
)δs
Π1−δss s.t.(2b),(7b),(10),(11b)
where δi (i = s,m) denotes the bargaining strength of the labour union. The solution of
the wage negotiation yields, after some manipulation, the standard result
w j = (1+λi)w¯ j ∀ j = M,L (14)
where the mark-up on the medium- and low-skilled outside options is given, respectively,
by
λm =
δm
(1−α−ν)(θ −1) (15a)
λs =
δs
(1−β −η)(θ −1) . (15b)
3.5.1. Manufacturing wage curve
As shown by the stylized facts, medium skilled workers have a relatively high incidence
of over qualification. Several empirical studies suggest that a significant and increasing
proportion of low-skilled jobs are nowadays carried out by better educated, over-qualified
workers - see Borghans and de Grip (2000) and Hartog (2000) for an overview of these
studies.
Following these stylized facts, we assume that the medium-skilled workers face the
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risk of holding a low-skilled job in the services sector when they cannot find employment
in the manufacturing sector. As a consequence, they will lead the low-skilled workers
into unemployment. This suggests that the rise in low-skilled unemployment would not
only be the result of a relative demand shift, but also the consequence of a relative supply
shift which leads to “crowding-out” of low-skilled workers as has also been observed by
Pierrard and Snessens (2003).
The medium-skilled over-qualification rate is defined by
oM = 1− MNM (16)
with NM as the total medium-skilled labour force.
Since frictions in the medium-skilled labour market is described by the over-qualification
risk, then in the general equilibrium context as well as by the symmetry assumption, the
reference wage of a medium-skilled worker (w¯M) can be interpreted as:
w¯M = (1−oM)wM +oMwL. (17)
Substituting this expression into (14) and rearranging, we obtain the manufacturing wage
curve (WCm)
wM =Φ(λm,oM)wL, (18)
where Φ(λm,oM) = (1+λm)oM1−(1+λm)(1−oM) . That is, as long as the manufacturing union has some
bargaining power, δm > 0, it will set a markup denoted by Φ(·) over the low-skilled wage
rate. If, however, δm→ 0, then λm→ 0 and wM → wL denoting the perfect competition
case. One can easily show that ∂Φ/∂oM < 0 implying the wage curve is increasing in
employment of medium skilled workers.
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3.5.2. Service wage curve
The low-skilled unemployment rate is defined by:9
uL = 1− L−oMNMNL (19)
with NL denoting the total low-skilled labour force.
Contrary to manufacturing, low-skilled workers face the risk of being unemployed
and thus receiving an unemployment benefit, b. Recalling the symmetry assumption, the
outside option (or the average income) of the low-skilled workers is defined as:
w¯L = (1−uL)wL+uLb (20)
Furthermore, we assume that the level of benefits is tied closely to the average wage which
is in line with the evidence. Weiss and Garloff (2009), for example, show that the level
of benefits is tied closely to per-capita income in most European countries while in the
Anglo-Saxon countries there was no adjustment over the last two decades. Consequently,
we define b as a percentage (ξ ) of average low- and medium-skilled wages weighted by
κ:10
b = ξ (κwM +(1−κ)wL). (21)
Using this definition for b in (20) and substituting then the resulting equation in (14), after
rearranging, we obtain the following aggregated service wage curve (WCs)
wL = Ψ(λs,uL)wM (22)
where Ψ(λs,uL) = (1+λs)ξκuL(1+λs)(1−ξ (1−κ))uL−λs . Similarly to the manufacturing wage curve, one
can verify that ∂Ψ/∂uL < 0. Hence the wage curve is increasing in the employment of
9Note, the service trade union does not take into account the crowding-out effect when negotiating over
the wage rate and therefore, the perceived unemployment rate is simply given by upL = 1− LNL . We use this
property in the analysis of the interaction between the service and manufacturing wages.
10Note that for κ = 0 we obtain the standard definition of unemployment benefits as the constant “re-
placement rate”, b/wL = ξ . In this case, however, the linkage between wL and wM disappears and the
service wage curve will be defined as wL = (1+ λs)((1− uL)wL + uLb). Consequently, the equilibrium
unemployment rate, uL, will be constant and depends only on the parameters of the model implying that it
does not react any longer to a migration shock.
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low-skilled workers. Note that if the service labour union looses the bargaining power,
then the perfect competition outcome with no unemployment results, i.e. if δs→ 0, then
λs→ 0 and wL→ b.
3.6. Interaction between low- and medium-skill wages
Due to the risk of over-qualification and the endogenous unemployment benefits, there is
an interdependency between the low- and medium-skill wages. We show that the condi-
tion for the unique equilibrium is assured by the fact that both wage curves are monoton-
ically increasing in the wage rates, starting from positive intercepts. However, the latter
requires lower boundaries on both unemployment and over-qualification rates. Moreover,
both curves should intersect such that the following relation is ensured, wM > wL > 0 .
We now elaborate on the shape and properties of both wage curves derived in the
previous section.
3.6.1. Properties of manufacturing wage curve
The partial features of the manufacturing wage curve (i.e. taking wL as given), can be
demonstrated as follows. For a better realization, rewrite (18) as
wL
wM
=Φ(λm,oM)−1 ≡ 1− λ¯moM(wM) (23)
where λ¯m = λm1+λm and oM(wM) is given by (16). Now, the LHS and RHS can both be
seen as a function of wM for given values of wL. This is because manufacturing unions
take the outside option (wL) as given when they negotiate. Then, it can be easily verified
that the LHS of (23) is a decreasing function of wM but the RHS is increasing for certain
values of both oM and wM, as will be discussed below. These relationships are illustrated
in Figure 2.
Consider first the right panel of Figure 2. Then, recalling (18), we can draw two
curves: one shows the negative relation between the relative wage rate due to changes
in wM (LHS of (23)) holding the low-skilled wage fixed; the second curve illustrates
the positive relation between the inverse-wage-mark-up function (Φ−1) and the medium-
skilled wage rate (wM). This relation follows from the positive relationship between
the over-qualification rate and the medium-skilled wage rate as higher wages induces a
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Figure 2: Properties of manufacturing wage curve
wM1
1 1
1+λm
relative wage curve: wL/wM
oM
Φ−1(wM )
Φ−1(oM )
o˜M w˜M
decline in the labour demand and increase, thus, the risk of over-qualification. Recalling
the medium-skilled labour demand (6b) and the over-qualification rate (16), then, one can
verify the limit cases
lim
wM→∞
Md = 0 ⇒ lim
wM→∞
oM = 1 ⇒ lim
wM→∞
Φ−1 =
1
1+λm
.
The intersection between the two curves in the right plane will determine the equilibrium
over-qualification rate and medium-skilled wage level for changes in the low-skilled wage
rate. We conclude
Lemma 1. Positive wages are ensured iff oM ∈ (o˜M,1).
Proof. The proof is rather straight forward. Due to the non-negativity assumption of the
wage rates, it follows from (23):
Φ−1 > 0
λ¯m
oM
< 1
oM > o˜M ≡ λm1+λm
wM > w˜M ≡
[
(1−α−ν)(r/ν)ν(wH/α)α
NM
(1+λm)Ym
A
] 1
α+ν
where we used the over-qualification definition (16) and labour demand function (6b) for
the last inequality. This defines the lower boundary of the over-qualification rate.
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3.6.2. Properties of service wage curve
Similarly, the partial behaviour of the service wage-curve can be assessed as follows.
First, rewrite (22) as
wM
wL
=Ψ(λs,uL)−1 ≡ 1+ 1−ξξκ −
λ¯s
ξκuL
(24)
where λ¯s = λs1+λs . With the same intention described above, we define both the LHS and
RHS of (24) as functions of wL for given values of wM. The argumentation is analogue
to one on the manufacturing wage curve. Thus, we can define two curves with opposite
relations to changes in wM as shown in the right plane of Figure (3), whereas the left
plane shows the relation between (Ψ−1) and the unemployment rate (uL).
Figure 3: Properties of service wage curve
wL1
1 + 1−ξξκ 1 +
1−ξ−λ¯s
ξκ
relative wage curve: wM/wL
uL
Ψ−1(wL)Ψ
−1(uL) 1
u˜L w˜L
However, the condition that must be satisfied in this case is summarized by the fol-
lowing lemma.
Lemma 2. The relation wM > wL is ensured iff uL ∈ (u˜L,1).
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Proof. From (24), it follows:
Ψ−1 > 1
λ¯s
uL
< 1−ξ
uL > u˜L ≡ λ¯s1−ξ
wL > w˜L ≡
[
(1−β −η)(r/η)η(wH/β )β
((1−q)NL)
Ys
B
] 1
β+η
where q ≡ (1− λ¯s1−ξ ). For the last inequality we used the definition of perceived unem-
ployment rate (explained in footnote 9), and the low-skilled labour demand (7b). This
implies that for values of unemployment rate uL ∈ (0, u˜L] the relation between low- and
medium-skilled wage rates is violated, i.e. wM ≤ wL. Therefore, to ensure wM > wL, the
unemployment rate must be strictly larger than the lower boundary u˜L.
Now, from these conditions, the unique intersection of the two wage-setting curves
can be shown graphically in the (wM,wL)-plane. By Lemma 1 and 2, wM > wL > 0.
This indicates that in the (wM,wL)-space the wage relation should always be above the 45
degree line. Starting with WCm, one sees from the RHS plane of Figure 2 that for large
values of the low-skilled wage rate, the medium-skilled equilibrium wage rises along the
Φ−1 curve due to upward shifts of the relative wage curve. Hence, higher wL increases
equilibrium wM and with it the over-qualification rate which converges to 1+ λm, the
reciprocal of the limit shown in Figure 2.
Analogously, the derivation of WCs can be explained by recalling the RHS of Figure
3. Now, changes in wM are associated with moving along the Ψ−1 curve. However,
as explained above, the necessary condition requires that Ψ−1 > 1 for wL > w˜L. This
indicates that in (wM,wL)-space the WCs must start above the 45 degree line. As described
above, higher wM leads to higher wL along the Ψ−1 curve converging to the limit 1+
1−ξ−λ¯s
ξκ . However, it should be noted that in the (wM,wL)-plane, the inverse service wage
curve is drawn. To ensure a unique equilibrium, 1+ 1−ξ−λ¯sξκ > 1+λm must hold which
leads to the following lemma.
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Figure 4: Unique equilibrium
WCs
WCm
1 + λm1 +
1−ξ−λ¯s
ξκ
wL
wM
w∗M
w∗L
45
w˜L
w˜M
Lemma 3. A unique intersection between the two wage curves is ensured for all
ξ < ξ˜ ≡ 1
1+λs
1
1+κλm
.
In Table 3, we summarize these conditions and assume that they hold.11
An illustration of the interdependence process is that an increase in productivity of
manufacturing, relative to that of services, increases the wage rate in the services sector
without any justification by the corresponding productivity increases in the latter. This
phenomenon is also widely recognized as the main cause of the so-called Baumol’s dis-
ease, which refers to the increasing share of services relative to manufacturing in an
advanced economy - see, for instance, Hartwig (2011). It also corresponds to the ob-
servation that the low wage differentiation in the Continental Europe is attributed to the
centralization and coordination of wage formation (Siebert, 1997).
11In the calibration of the model we show that these conditions do hold for plausible parameter values -
see Appendix.
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Table 3: Equilibrium Conditions
Parameter/Variable Range Condition
oM ∈ (o˜M,1)
Lemma 1
wM > w˜M
uL ∈ (u˜L,1)
Lemma 2
wL > w˜L
ξ < ξ˜ Lemma 3
4. The General Equilibrium Solution
In this section we present the general equilibrium comparative static analysis. The ap-
proach we choose is the following: First, we derive the changes from the initial equilib-
rium. We then give the intuitive interpretation of the results followed by a summary of
the general equilibrium repercussions on the over-qualification and unemployment rates
as well as on the relative wages.
4.1. A theoretical assessment without capital input
Following the standard approach pursued by Jones (1965), the comparative static analysis
can be assessed by means of log-linearization to denote changes from the initial equilib-
rium, i.e. xˆ = ln
(x+dx
x
)' dx/x.
By the Le ChatelierSamuelson principle, ignoring capital will only affect the results
quantitatively, but not in qualitative terms, see Felbermayr and Kohler (2007). For that
reason, and for convenience, we simplify the analysis by setting ν = η = 0, and thus
reducing the model to a two-factor production function with labour as the only input
factor.
To begin with, take the total differentiation of the log-difference of the labour demand
functions (6a) and (6b), (7a) and (7b), to obtain
wˆH− wˆM = Mˆ− Hˆm (25.1)
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wˆH− wˆL = Lˆ− Hˆs (25.2)
Linearising the equilibrium conditions for the low- and medium-skilled labour markets,
L = (1−uL)NL +oMNM and M = (1−oM)NM, as well as the market clearing condition
for the high-skilled labour, yield
Lˆ = l(NˆL− u¯LuˆL)+(1− l)(NˆM + oˆM) (25.3)
Mˆ = (NˆM− o¯MoˆM) (25.4)
NˆH = hHˆm+(1−h)Hˆs (25.5)
where u¯L = uL1−uL , o¯M =
oM
1−oM , and h =
Hm
NH
. Note that changes in the low-skilled employ-
ment are weighted by l = (1−uL)NLL . Similarly, log-linearisation of the wage curves (18)
and (22), yield
wˆM− wˆL = εmoˆM (25.6)
wˆL− wˆM = εsuˆL (25.7)
where εm = − λ¯moMΦ(·) and εs = −
λ¯s
ξκuL
Ψ(·) denote the wage curve elasticities. From the
price-setting definitions (11a) and (11b) we obtain
Pˆm = (αwˆH +(1−α)wˆM) (25.8)
Pˆs = (β wˆH +(1−β )wˆL) (25.9)
Log-linearisation of the intermediate goods demand equations, (2a) and (2b), yields
Yˆm = Xˆ−θ Pˆm (25.10)
Yˆs = Xˆ−θ Pˆs (25.11)
Changes in the total output can, then, be determined by log-linearising (1) which yields
Xˆ = ϕxYˆm+(1−ϕx)Yˆs (25.12)
with ϕx = γ
(Ym
X
)σx
= PmYmX denoting the share of Ym in X . Finally, log-linearising the
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production functions (3a) and (3b), respectively, yields
Yˆm = αHˆm+(1−α)Mˆ (25.13)
Yˆs = β Hˆs+(1−β )Lˆ (25.14)
This system of fourteen equations, (25.1)-(25.14), allows for the assessment of the general
equilibrium effects on the fourteen endogenous variables Xˆ ,Yˆm,Yˆs, Pˆm, Pˆs, Hˆm, Hˆs,Mˆ, Lˆ, oˆM,
uˆL, wˆH , wˆM, wˆL.
4.2. Comparative static analysis
In this section we examine the impact of an exogenous increase in the labour supply,
which we attribute to immigration in each of the labour markets of our model. Particu-
larly, we are interested in the repercussions on the low- and medium-skilled labour mar-
kets and on output. Intuitively, the wage-setting mechanism reveals that any exogenous
increase in the labour endowments worsening (or improving) the labour market condi-
tion for one of the unionised labour, ceteris paribus, has also consequences for the other
unionised labour. This is due to the fact that an increase in oM (or uL) will force the unions
for wag restraint. Therefore, the wage indexation between both medium- and low-skilled
unionised workers, resulting from the double bargaining mechanism as well as the en-
dogenous unemployment benefits, implies that the outside option of the other unionised
labour market will be affected too. Note that the bumping down effect has an additional
direct impact on the low-skilled wages as uL increases, see Eq. (19).
Accounting for the general equilibrium repercussions, however, we find that the wage
restraint behaviour induces a higher labour demand for that type of labour. This is accom-
panied by changes in the allocation of high-skilled labour across the sectors as well as in
the demand for goods due to goods price effects. As we show below, the crucial factor
that determines the qualitative impact of migration reveals to be the factor cost share of
the high-skilled labour. In what follows, we omit the formal proofs and provide instead
the economic intuition of the results.12.
The first interesting outcome of the analysis regarding changes in the wages as well
12A full formal derivation of the general equilibrium comparative static analysis is beyond the scope of
this paper, and is therefore given in an extra appendix which can be provided upon request.
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as in unemployment and over-qualification rates is the following
Proposition 4. A proportional increase in supply of all three skill groups is consistent
with no change in the wages as well as in over-qualification and unemployment rates.
The proportional increase of the labour force implies a scale effect as more resources
are available in the economy to utilize. Note, however, that the marginal productivity of
labour, the high-skilled labour reallocation, the output expansion of both sectors all de-
pend on the size of (α −β ), as we show below when discussing migration of each type
of labour separately. Intuitively, for similar cost shares of the high-skilled labour across
the two sectors, i.e. (α − β )→ 0, both sectors expand symmetrically due to propor-
tional changes in the production costs, or alternatively in the marginal productivity, and
thus inducing constant relative goods prices. Therefore, X , Ym, Ys, L and M all increase
approximately proportionally. As shown in the last column of Table 4, the impact of mi-
gration of any skill group on X is always positive. Thus, setting Xˆ = 0 does not affect the
results qualitatively, and allows for a better exposition of the driving forces behind the
immigration effects.
Next, we discuss the qualitative effects of an exogenous shock of each of the skill
groups separately on low- and medium-skilled labour markets. An alternative way to
demonstrate the effects on the unemployment and over-qualification rates is to reduce the
system of equations derived in the previous section and to solve it for oˆM and uˆL. In doing
so, we obtain the following expressions13
oˆM =
(θ −1)θ
ζ
(β −α)wˆH− (β +θ(1−β ))− (α+θ(1−α))(1− l)ζ NˆM
+
(α+θ(1−α))l
ζ
NˆL (26)
uˆL = −κoˆM (27)
where ζ is a negative constant and κ = εmεs > 0. These two equations can be utilized
to illustrate the role of the high-skilled cost shares (α , β ), and to analyse the effects of
different migration flows.
13The derivation can be worked out as follows: equalize (25.13) and (25.10) as well as (25.14) and
(25.11) to eliminate Yˆm and Yˆs. Then, solve (25.1) and (25.2) for Hˆm and Hˆs, respectively, and substitute
them in the previously obtained equations. We then obtain two equations which can be solved for wˆM and
wˆL. Utilizing them in Eq. (25.6) and making use of (25.3) and (25.4), then after rearranging we obtain Eq.
(26).
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Table 4: Comparative Static Results
wˆH wˆM wˆL oˆM uˆL Xˆ
NˆH
β > α + −
β = α − + + 0 0 +
β < α − +
NˆM
β > α +/− −/+
β = α + − − + − +
β < α + −
NˆL + − − − + +
Assume first the scenario where only high-skilled immigration is allowed, i.e. NˆH >
0 = NˆM = NˆL. Unambiguously, the Walrasian nature of the high-skilled labour market
induces a decline in wˆH . The labour market implication for the other two skill groups
reduces, therefore, to the coefficient of wH in (26). However, the crucial assumption that
characterizes this coefficient is the following. As pointed out by Hamermesh (1993),
in a two factor model the inverse of the elasticity of substitution is called the elasticity
of complementarity indicating the percentage change in factor prices due to a 1 percent
change in relative inputs. It denotes how factor prices that a representative firm must
pay respond to an exogenous change in factor supply. Using a Cobb-Douglas function
implies that both elasticities of substitution and of complementarity equal unity. On the
other hand, the goods demand functions show to what extent demand for the two goods
will adjust for changes in the goods prices which is determined by the parameter θ . Thus,
in our setting, the labour substitution effect within each of the two major sectors is always
dominated by the goods demand effect, i.e. θ > 1. This relation is shown in the numerator
of the wˆH coefficient in Eq. (26).14 The results are summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 5. If the economy is characterized by a Cobb-Douglas technology and 1−
1/θ > 0, then high-skilled migration has
i) a neutral impact on both low- and medium-skilled labour markets for all α ≈ β
14See Felbermayr and Kohler (2007) for the case of CES production functions.
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ii) a positive (negative) effect on the low (medium)-skilled labour market for all α <
β , and vice versa.
The intuition is the following. It is clear that the right-hand-side of (26) reduces to
the coefficient of wH . As mentioned above, due to the complementarity effect both wˆL
and wˆM increase. However, the relative increase depends on the size of the high-skilled
cost share in each sector. The complementarity effect, for example, will be stronger in
the manufacturing sector, for all α > β , as the marginal productivity of medium-skilled
workers rises relatively stronger than of low-skilled workers - or alternatively, we could
argue that manufacturing firms experience a stronger decline in the production costs rel-
ative to the firms in the service sector. As goods prices are endogenous, the relative
manufacturing goods price declines inducing a favourable shift in the demand for man-
ufacturing goods, and thus, to a reallocation of high-skilled labour towards that sector.
However, in the service sector the demand for low-skilled labour increases accompanied
by a decline in uL and an increase in oM. This can be verified from the coefficient of wH
in (26). The opposite result for α < β follows by analogy. These effects are illustrated in
the first five columns of Table 4 related to the impact of high-skilled migration (NˆH).
The assessment of only medium-skilled migration, i.e. NˆM > 0 = NˆH = NˆL, leads to
the following results
Proposition 6. Immigration of only medium-skilled workers has a negative effect on both
medium- and low-skilled wages, a positive effect on the over-qualification rate, but a
negative impact on the low-skilled unemployment.
In this case, the right-hand-side of (26) reduces to the two first expressions on the
RHS. It is straightforward that the high-skilled wage rate increases due to the comple-
mentarity effect. Therefore, following the discussion above, we have to elaborate on the
signs of the two coefficients. Assuming (α − β )→ 0 the analysis reduces to the coef-
ficient of NˆM which will be then simply −(α + θ(1−α))l/ζ with ζ < 0. Thus, the
medium-skilled labour market friction unambiguously increases which in turn indicates
from (27) that uˆL < 0.15 The intuition behind the increase in the over-qualification is that
due to labour market frictions not all new arriving medium-skilled workers can be ab-
sorbed by the labour market. This can be verified from (25.4) where the medium-skilled
15In the unlikely extreme where (α−β )→−∞, we find oˆM < 0 < uˆL inducing (wˆM− wˆL)> 0.
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labour demand grows less proportional to NˆM. Since, the bumping down effect induces in
turn an increase in low-skilled unemployment, ceteris paribus, the unions in the service
sector are forced for wage restraint inducing a decline in the low-skilled wage. However,
lower wages induce an increase in the demand for low-skilled employment. On the other
hand, the relative increase in the high-skilled wage rate due to the complementarity ef-
fect, induces firms to substitute for high-skilled labour in both sectors. The low-skilled
labour demand effect is stronger so that the bumping down effect is dominated which is
also verified by our numerical assessment. Thus, the decline in the low-skilled wage rate
is mitigated by this effect.
This leads us to the second interesting observation where the relative wage effects
are consistent with wage polarization. This can be simply verified from (25.6) where
for (α − β )→ 0, oˆM > 0 inducing wˆM − wˆL < 0. Similarly, it holds by utilizing (27).
Obviously, it follows wˆH− wˆM > 0 from (25.1).
Proposition 7. Medium-skilled immigration induces wage polarization.
The discussion on the results of low-skilled immigration is based on similar argumen-
tation. A summary of the results is presented in Table 4. As mentioned above, the Table
also shows that total output will increase in all scenarios. The reason is obvious. A more
interesting question is, however, whether output per capita will increase. To answer that
question we will turn to the simulation results of the model, presented in next section.
5. Numerical assessment
To simulate the model, we use the EUKLEMS database to calibrate the parameter values
which is presented in the Appendix. We use the calibrated parameters and benchmark
values of the variables to simulate the impact of migration on output and the labour mar-
ket.
5.1. Migration scenarios
Similarly to Felbermayr and Kohler (2007), we simulate migration scenarios for differ-
ent skill compositions of migration flows. Table 5 gives an overview of our simulation
scenarios.
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Table 5: Simulation scenarios
Scenario Description
(I) Perfectly balanced immigration
(II) Inflow at tails
(III) Inflow of medium- and high-skilled
(IV) High-skilled inflow only
(V) Medium-skilled inflow only
(VI) Low-skilled inflow only
In scenario (I), we assume a proportional increase in all skill levels which resembles
approximately the Dutch immigration scenario, see Muysken and Ziesemer (2011). In
scenario (II) we assume immigration to be composed of 75% low-skilled and 25% high-
skilled labour. As pointed out by Felbermayr and Kohler (2007), this denotes the most
realistic case for the past in the OECD countries, as it features bimodality in migration
flows with a bias towards low-skilled migration. We also simulate the model for the cur-
rent migration pattern within the EU (scenario (III)) where the majority of migrants from
new member states (Poland and Baltic states) are predominantly young with medium- or
high skill levels (Blanchflower et al., 2007). In doing so, we use as a benchmark the rel-
ative share of high-skilled foreign labour force in the U.S. which can be seen as a target
value and subtract from that the value for Germany.16 We, then, compute the percentage
inflows such that the overall size of inflows equals 10% of the total labour force.17 The
resulting inflow consists for 44.3% of high skilled workers and the remaining part, 55.7%,
is medium skilled. We also assess the quantitative impact of each skill groups separately
in the scenarios (IV)-(VI). Furthermore, to ensure comparability between the different
cases and due to the fact that just under 10% of the German workforce are foreign born,
all scenarios are specified such that the overall size of the inflow is approximately 10%
16As used in the migration literature, see Ziesemer (2011), we take the Worldbank data on migration
stocks which provide information by educational attainment of immigrants and total labour force. However,
the Worldbank data set provides only information for 1975 to 2000 which we use as a proxy.
17The computation is as follows: the share of high-skilled immigrants in the U.S. labour force is about
10.91% and in the German labour force about 6.48% in 2000 which makes a difference of 4.43%. There-
fore, in scenario (III) the high-skilled labour force has to rise by 44.30% = 4.43%× (N/NH) which gives
us a total increase in medium-skilled labour force by 8.80% = (10%−4.43%)× (N/NM).
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of the initial labour force. Finally, we assume a full adjustment of capital stock. Hence,
the results indicate long-run effects.
5.2. Simulation results
The effect of various migration inflows is shown in Table 6. Interestingly, a perfectly bal-
anced migration flow has a neutral impact on the receiving economy. This is mainly due
to the linear homogeneity nature of the production functions and full capital adjustments
which verifies the results of the theoretical part (Section 4.2.). Migration flow at the tails
of the skill distribution (scenario II) has mild positive wage effects for low- and medium-
skilled labour, while high-skilled labour is hurt slightly. The labour market conditions
of medium-skilled workers improve significantly while low-skilled unemployment risk
is increased slightly. Deterioration in the relative commodity prices induces favourable
demand shift for service goods and thus triggers relatively more high-skilled towards that
sector. We see that the one-skill-type migration policy (scenarios (IV)-(VI)) reflect per-
fectly the predictions of the model discussed in the theoretical part. Therefore, changes in
commodity prices (Pm,Ps) due to changes in factor prices (wH ,wM,wL) have significant
effects on the reallocation of the mobile labour and on the labour market outcomes of
the sector-specific labour. Looking at the welfare effects by means of GDP per head, we
obtain the widely observed results where high-skilled migration (scenario IV) is unam-
biguously beneficial for the receiving country reflected in an increase of GDP per capita
by 9% whereas low-skilled migration (scenario VI) might indeed be harmful, a decline of
GDP per capita by 2%. However, with respect to medium-skilled migration (scenario V),
the result implies a neutral impact as denoted by the overall increase of GDP per capita by
almost 10%. Moreover, the impact on the relative medium-skilled wage rate shows the
polarization effect confirming our hypothesis that the rise in medium-skilled migration
might partly explain this phenomenon.
Finally, the most plausible scenario of a migration flow at the higher skill distribution
(scenario III), which is dominated by medium skilled workers, has a positive welfare
effect as per capita income rises by 3.75%. This induces us to conclude that overall
medium skilled immigration has a positive effect on the economy.
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Table 6: Simulation of labour market effects of migration
% changes in Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Labour supply NˆH 10.00 11.13 44.3 100.00 0.00 0.00
NˆM 10.00 0.00 8.80 0.00 15.88 0.00
NˆL 10.00 33.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 37.04
Relative wages wˆH− wˆM 0.00 −2.84 −37.24 −98.86 11.81 9.05
wˆL− wˆM 0.00 −0.743 0.48 0.72 0.28 −0.91
Over-qual. rate oˆM 0.00 −5.38 3.43 5.24 2.00 −6.61
Unempl. rate uˆL 0.00 0.60 −0.39 −0.59 −0.22 0.74
Employment
Medium Mˆ 10.00 7.12 4.25 −6.95 13.23 8.76
Low Lˆ 10.00 9.44 7.57 3.27 11.04 10.07
Reallocation Hˆm 10.00 9.97 41.50 91.91 1.41 −0.29
Hˆs 10.00 11.54 45.29 102.86 −0.50 0.10
Capital Kˆm 10.00 8.06 11.08 11.47 10.83 7.52
accumulation Kˆs 10.00 9.63 14.88 22.42 8.93 7.91
Prices Pˆm 0.00 0.37 0.89 2.57 −0.44 0.09
Pˆs 0.00 −0.15 −0.37 −1.08 0.19 −0.04
Output Yˆm 10.00 7.69 10.19 8.90 11.28 7.43
Yˆs 10.00 9.78 15.25 23.50 8.74 7.95
Xˆ 10.00 9.17 13.75 19.19 9.49 7.80
Notes: Scenario (I) has, actually, an asymmetric impact. That is, expansion of service sector is slightly
stronger than of manufacturing, e.g. Yˆs = 10.000103 and Yˆm = 10.000088. This is due to the fact that the
high-skilled shares are not identical.
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6. Concluding remarks
In this paper we present a theoretical model motivated by our stylized facts with two
major (manufacturing and services) sectors and heterogeneous labour markets defined
by three skill groups to analyse the impact of various skill compositions of immigration.
Particular attention is paid to the impact of immigration of medium skilled workers. Al-
though this has been neglected in the literature, our stylized facts show the importance
of this specific skill group. The analytical solution of the model shows that it is able
to reproduce the stylized facts. We elaborate the labour market as well as the welfare
impacts of different migration scenarios. The following outcomes are at the core of our
analysis. First, a perfectly balanced immigration flow has a neutral effect on the re-
ceiving economy such that GDP per capita remains constant. Regarding the effect of
different skill compositions of immigrants two types of immigration scenarios (skilled
and unskilled) have been extensively studied. In line with the common conclusion we
also find that high-skilled immigration is beneficial for the receiving economy, whereas
low-skilled immigration is harmful. Our main results, which focus on medium skilled
immigration, are complementary to these findings. First, a stronger wage indexation be-
tween medium-skilled and low-skilled might indeed explain the recent negative relation
between the over-qualification rate and the unemployment rate. Second, our framework
indicates that the recent wage polarization effect might be partly explained by the relative
increase in the supply of medium-skilled labour.
Using data for Germany, we analyse the quantitative impact of different immigra-
tion scenarios. The results reveal, indeed, that immigration of medium-skilled labour
can generate favourable economic outcomes. It boosts, in particular, the labour market
conditions for low-skilled labour. An increase in the medium-skilled endowments raises
total output to the increase of the labour force, indicating a neutral impact. Moreover,
simulating the recent migration pattern (medium- and high-skilled) in the course of EU
enlargement reveals an improvement by 3.75% in per capita income. Second, while the
impact of immigration on unemployment and on over-qualification has been separately
analysed, this paper elaborates the immigration effect on both types of labour market
frictions simultaneously.
Our numerical results also reveal that sector-specific migration induces a realloca-
tion of high-skilled labour towards that sector and thus a relatively stronger expansion
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of that sector. Contrary to standard specific-factors models with Walrasian labour mar-
kets where increase in the endowments of the sector-specific factor leads to a contraction
of the other sector due to the reallocation of the mobile factor, we observe that in any
migration scenarios both sectors always expand. The reasoning for this result is that
now immigration of any sector-specific labour has also an adverse effect on the wages of
the other sector-specific labour, an outcome which is essentially due to the wage setting
mechanism resulting from our bargaining model. This induces firms to utilize the previ-
ously idle labour in response to the reallocation of the high-skilled labour into the other
sector.
Furthermore, the endogenous goods prices resulting from the price-setting behaviour
are the important economic mechanism in explaining the substitutability between differ-
ent type of labour. Our findings reveal that labour migration has a productivity effect for
the firms by lowering the production costs. This in turn explains the changes in the skill
intensity across the sectors which in the case of the Cobb-Douglas technology is essen-
tially determined by the relative high-skilled cost shares across the sectors. Moreover,
the neutral impact of medium-skilled migration gives an important insight for policy de-
sign regarding migration policies to satisfy the future labour replacement demand, for
instance, due to ageing.
Appendix: Benchmark statistics and calibration
In order to provide a numerical solution of the model, we match the theoretical model
with the data for a certain period. In doing so, we define values for the production side
such as the input shares as well as for variables and parameters of our designed labour
market like unemployment and over-qualification rates. Our exogenous parameters are
(α,β ,ν ,η ,σx,θ ,κ,ξ ,δm,δs,λm,λs). The endogenous variables are (Hm,Hs,M,L,uL,oM,
wH ,wM,wL, l,h,Ym,Ys,Pm,Ps) with the following exogenous variables (NH ,NM,NL). We
compute the values mostly from the EUKLEMS database.18 We also use when necessary
different sources to obtain the values for the specific labour market parameters and vari-
ables. Table 7 provides an overview of the calibrated and benchmark equilibrium values.
Note, in order to have the best-fit of the model with the data, we define the cost shares of
18For an extensive description of the data and the calibration approach, we refer the reader to the working
paper version which will be provided upon request.
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the specific input factors simply as the sum of low- and med-skilled workers cost shares
in each sector. Table 8 summarizes further the labour market benchmark values.
Table 7: Calibrated and benchmark equilibrium values for the industries
Description Parameter/Variable Value
Manuf. value-add (in 1000 Euros)(a) PmYm 583,191
Service value-add (in 1000 Euros)(a) PsYs 1,393,790
High-skilled labour force (in 1000 persons)(a) NH 3870
Med-skilled labour force (in 1000 persons)(a) NM 24043
Low-skilled labour force (in 1000 persons)(a) NL 10092
Total labour force N = NH +NM +NL 38005
Unemployment rate(b) uL 0.156
Manuf. capital cost share(a) ν 0.27
Manuf. high-skilled cost share(a) α 0.11
Manuf. med-skilled cost share(a) 1−α−ν 0.62
Serv. capital cost share(a) η 0.38
Serv. high-skilled cost share(a) β 0.13
Serv. low-skilled cost share(a) 1−β −η 0.49
Elasticity of Substitution(c) θ = 11−σx 4
σx 0.75
(a) Computed from EUKLEMS data base.
(b) From OECD (2007, Table II.A1.1), denoting 2003-2004
average.
(c) From Abraham et al. (2009).
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Table 8: Labour market benchmark values
Description Parameter/Variable Value
Over-qualification rate(d) oM 0.57
Manuf. high-skilled empl. (in 1000)(e) Hm 1012
Serv. high-skilled empl. (in 1000) Hs = NH−Hm 2859
h = HmNH 0.26
Med-skilled empl. (in 1000) M = (1−oM)NM 10339
Low-skilled empl. (in 1000) L = (1−uL)NL+oMNM 22223
l = (1−uL)NL/L 0.38
High-skilled wage rate( f ) wH = αPmYm/Hm 63.38
Med-skilled wage rate( f ) wM = (1−α−ν)PmYm/M 34.97
Low-skilled wage rate( f ) wL = (1−β −η)PsYs/L 30.73
Manuf. trade union bargaining power(g) δm 0.137
λm 0.0743
Serv. trade union bargaining power(h) δs 0.087
λs 0.0658
Proportionate factor(i) ξ 0.565
Weighting factor( j) κ 0.50
Manuf. wage curve Φ(·) = wMwL 1.14
Service wage curve Ψ(·) = wLwM 0.88
Elasticity manuf. wage curve εoM =−∂ logΦ(·)∂ logoM =−
λm
1+λm
1
oM
Φ(·) -0.14
Elasticity serv. wage curve εuL =−∂ logΨ(·)∂ loguL =−
λs
1+λs
1
ξκuL
Ψ(·) -1.23
(d) Calibrated to ensure wH > wM > wL > b.
(e) Calibration is based on the condition α PmYmHm = wH = β
PsYs
NH−Hm .
( f ) Calibration is based on the EUKLEMS data.
(g) Calibrated from the manufacturing wage-setting curve (18) and (15a).
(h) Calibrated from the manufacturing wage-setting curve (22) and (15b).
(i) Assumed.
( j) Assumed.
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